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CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN FAITH HEALING
C. C. CAWLEY*
"The right to practice religion freely does not include
liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable
disease or the latter to ill health or death.... Parents may
be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not
follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make
martyrs of their children before they have reached the age
of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice
for themselves." - Rutledge, J., in
Prince v. Massachusetts
I. INTRODUCTION
Some chronicled demonstrations of the Divinity's existence and
power-e.g.: the Lord's changing Moses' rod into a serpent and
back again, and turning his hand "leprous as snow," then whole
again 2 - aim to bolster one's faith by no more than causing
wonder. Others, besides being "wonders," also result in some im-
mediate, personal benefit. Only such, strictly, are to be called
"miracles."3 Thus, with his shipload of disciples imperiled, Jesus
in stilling the wind and waves performed a miracle.4 Again, we
distinguish between miracles which do not involve healing, and
those that do. The healing riracles, in which disease is cured by
faith and prayer, we call "faith healing." Faith healers are those
who undertake to treat diseases by prayer and the exercise of faith.
Most Protestants and Cz.tholics subscribe to the sound notion
that "the Lord helps those who help themselves," and against their
illnesses apply the same vigor and means by which they win for
themselves food, clothing and shelter. From none of these tasks do
they ask or expect to be relieved. Today, then, most people have
their diseases treated by medical doctors; but the more serious a
man's illness, the more likely it is that he and his friends will at
the same time pray for his recovery. Thus, most religious people
today might be called at least "part time" faith healers. With such
people the law has no quarrel, and this study no concern. Certain
sects, however, undertake to treat disease solely by prayer. These
deny to themselves, and attempt to deny to their children, all the
aids of modern medical science. In popular usage the term faith
healer, and along with it, all too often, the headline expression, faith
death, have come to refer only to members of such sects.
*Author of Fool's Haven, a navel reviewed in 38 Minn. L. Rev. 87 (1953).
1. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 167 (1944).
2. Exodus 4:1-7.
3. This is the distinction made by the Encyclopaedia of Religion and
Ethics (1928), Vol. VIII, p. 676. at "Miracles."
4. Matthew 8:26.
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In any attempt to analyze the principles of law applicable to
faith healers, one finds himself forced at the same time to consider
sects- in particular the Jehovah's Witnesses, who are not at all
a faith-healing sect - which deny themselves medical aid on grounds
other than faith healing. For the faith healers' troubles arise not in
their attempt to heal by faith and prayer, but over the corollary to
that attempt -denial, at the same time, of medical aid; it is over
this deadly corollary that society is moved to intervene. And today,
by their spectacular attempts to deny blood transfusions to their
children, the Jehovah's Witnesses are hastening acceptance of a
swift, equity-type process, firmly grounded in the principle of
parens patriae, whereby the court looks askance at the parent's
claim to constitution-guaranteed religious freedom and resolutely
steps in to save the child's life.
There remains the question of the Christian Scientists, who
would tell us that disease - at least for those in the "know" - is
but an illusion, but notwithstanding objections to the contrary, this
sect is properly included in the camp of the faith healers. And as
a practical matter, society is presented with the same tragic package
of medical, legal and public health problems by the "true" faith-
healing sects, the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Christian Scientists.
This study examines the original situation which forced the federal
courts to qualify the First Amendment's broad wording as to
religious freedom. It traces the development and establishment, some
fifty-odd years ago, of parent liability in instances where, because
of religious belief, a child is harmed or dies through denial of
medical care. It then describes the heartening exercise, during the
last few years, of the "parens patriae" doctrine whereby the courts,
no longer resigned to punishing the parent after the child is dead,
instead take swift steps to keep the child alive. And finally, it con-
siders the faith healer's right to practice, the adult's right to submit,
and the touchy question of pastor liability as accessory to the
parent's criminal act.
II. THE FIRST AmENDMENT
Suppose that, in a certain state, a new sect arises, one divinely
dedicated to hacking off non-members' heads. The state, with no
statute against this unlikely practice, hastily enacts one. The sect
members, however, continue to hack, and when the state re-
monstrates, they are indignant- for their practice is commanded
by God, and therefore above earthly laws. Furthermore, the statute
is unconstitutional, because it prohibits the free exercise of religion.
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And they invite their would-be prosecutors to re-read the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . .... If the example is too
ridiculous, let us only change the state to a remote new territory,
and the head-hacking to polygamy. The problem now is hardly
hypothetical. Our grandfathers faced it. And in their solution, the
above clause of the First Amendment came in for considerable re-
assessment.
In 1847, the first of many well-organized Mormon caravans
reached the Salt Lake region. In this remote Mexican province,
unharassed by hostile "gentiles" and their profane state laws, the
Latter-Day Saints aimed to set up a divine, priest-ruled church-
state. But when, only a year later, the war with Mexico ended and
the territory was ceded to the United States, their hopes of self-
government went glimmering. In 1849, in a desperate effort to
avoid territorial rule, Brigham Young set up the provisional "State
of Deseret," which thereupon petitioned Congress for admission to
the Union. But Congress, already legislating a territorial govern-
ment, ignored the application. 5 In 1850, President Fillmore ap-
pointed Brigham Young territorial governor. In 1851, Utah's
Mormon-dominated legislature confirmed Deseret's charter of the
religious "Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints" - Brigham Young, President. The following year, the
Church officially proclaimed the doctrine of "plural marriage" as
a right and duty. In 1862, Lincoln signed the Morrill Bill, "An Act
to punish6 and prevent the Practice of Polygamy in the Territories
of the United States ... ." Also provided: that no territorial reli-
gious corporation should acquire over $50,000 in real-estate hold-
ings.
By 1867, not a single case had been tried under this law. By
1869, when, through Mormon pressure, the proposed anti-polygamy
'Cullom Bill failed of passage, the country was aroused. That year,
President Grant appointed a governor and judges who dared to
assert federal authority. These judges at once ruled that the United
States-not the territorial-marshal should impanel federal court
juries and that the U.S. attorney-general should prosecute federal
court indictments. In 1871, under a territorial adultery statute,
5. One reason: a petition by the citizens of Lee County, Illinois,
charging Deseret's organizers with treason, murder, robbery, the desire
for kingly government, levying duties, and polygamy. See Linn, William A.,
The Story of the Mormons (1902).
6. Five hundred dollar fine and five years' imprisonment.
[Vol. 39:48
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Brigham Young and others were indicted by a U.S. marshal-picked
grand jury for lewdness and improper cohabitation. But in 1872, the
United States Supreme Court reversed the judges' ruling. Young
was released, and the Utah federal courts were left practically
powerless. President Grant accordingly urged Congress to act, and,
in 1874, against desperate Mormon pressure, the Poland Bill was
passed. This removed all civil, chancery and criminal jurisdiction
from Utah's probate courts, restored the U.S. marshal's and at-
torney's powers, and allowed the challenge of a juror for polygamous
practice or belief. The stage was now set for a test case. That year,
Brigham Young's private secretary, George Reynolds, was in-
dicted for bigamy and convicted, but on appeal was freed because
the grand jury had been illegally drawn. In 1875, Reynolds again
was convicted, and in 1878, the Supreme Court sustained this
conviction, holding that religious belief could not justify an act
made criminal by law.7
During the four-year-long progress of the Reynolds case, no
other attempt had been made to enforce the law; in 1878, a women's
mass-meeting in Salt Lake City petitioned Congress to stop the
growing evil, setting forth that during the previous year there had
been more polygamous marriages than ever before. Presidents
Hayes, Garfield, and Arthur all urged Congress, in the light of the
Reynolds decision, to effectively implement enforcement. The
Edmunds Act, passed in 1882, forbade polygamists to vote or hold
office. Vigorous crusades against polygamy now began in Utah,
Idaho and Arizona. There were three polygamy convictions in Utah
in 1884, and 39 in 1885. But that year, the church's officers openly
urged opposition to the new laws, reiterating that "celestial
marriage" was divinely revealed and obligatory. Church leaders who
accepted imprisonment were honored as heroes; others went into
hiding or exile.
In 1886 there were 112 polygamy convictions. By then, about
one marriageable Mormon in five was partner to a polygamous
marriage, teachers and preachers were continuing to urge the prac-
tice, and the Church was doing nothing to stop them. By then, too,
the church corporation, in violation of the 1862 act, had acquired
some $2,000,000 in real estate. Accordingly, in 1887, Congress en-
acted the Edmunds-Tucker Act, dissolving the church corporation
and directing legal proceedings for seizing its property and winding
up its affairs. On September 30, 18878 the U.S. Attorney General
7. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1879).
8. Brigham Young had died a month earlier, on August 29, leaving 17
widows and 47 children.
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filed a bill in the Territorial Supreme Court, in the name of the
United States, against "the late corporation known and claiming to
exist as the 'Corporation of 1he Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints.' "
This case went to the United States Supreme Court. While it
was pending, the Idaho case of Davis v. Beason'0 posed a second
grave threat to Utah's Mormons. An Idaho statute required of a
prospective voter or office holder his oath that he was neither a
polygamist nor a member of an order which taught, advised, coun-
selled or encouraged the crime. This in effect barred even non-
polygamist members of the Church from voting or holding office in
Idaho. In 1889, one Davis and others, though church members, took
this oath. They were indicted for conspiracy to pervert administra-
tion of the Territory's laws, and convicted. Davis obtained a writ of
habeas corpus, contending that the facts in the indictment did not
constitute an offense, since the statute was contrary to the First
Amendment and therefore void. On appeal, on February 3, 1890,
the Supreme Court held the statute constitutional. This decision in-
spired the governor of Utah to draft a similar bill for Utah. And
with this bill-which would disfranchise and put out of office all
Utah Mormons-under consideration in Congress, the Supreme
Court, that May, affirmed the confiscation of the Mormon Church's
property.
To church president Wilford Woodruff the price of polygamous
belief finally appeared too high. He issued a manifesto announcing
his intention to submit to the laws of the land in regard to plural
marriage and advising all other Latter-Day Saints to do the same.
He proclaimed: "We are not preaching polygamy, nor permitting
any person to enter into its practice." A general readjustment fol-
lowed. In 1896, Utah was admitted to the Union, its constitution
declaring polygamous or plural marriage forever prohibited. Presi-
dential pardon, on condition. of future obedience to the law, was
proclaimed for all polygamists, and Congress restored the escheated
property to the church.
Faith-healing defendants invariably have raised the issue of
constitutional religious freedom. And as invariably, the prosecution
has cited the Reynolds case, and often the Late Corporation and
Davis v. Beason cases as well. George Reynolds' defense was that
the practice of polygamy was an accepted doctrine of his church,
9. Late Corporation of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. United States, 136 U. S. 1 (1890).
10. 133 U. S. 333 (1890).
[Vol. 39:48
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and that the Morrill Act of 1862, since it presumed to prohibit the
free exercise of his religion, was contrary to the First Amendment,
and therefore invalid. The questions facing the Supreme Court were
thus: 1) was the Act valid? and, 2) even if valid as to others, must
those practicing polygamy as a religious belief be excepted? The
Court, conceding that the First Amendment did not define the
word "religion," examined its framers' earlier statements, and
found therein the idea of allowing liberty of conscience but certainly
no inclination to tolerate acts of licentiousness or acts against the
peace and public safety. This also was the interpretation already ex-
pressed in thirteen state constitutions. The Court's conclusion: the
First Amendment deprived Congress of all legislative power over
mere opinion, but left Congress free to reach actions in violation of
social duties or subversive of good order. Then, was polygamy
licentious? The Court found the practice limited to Asiatic and
African peoples, while odious in northern and western Europe.
England from earliest times had treated it as an offense against
society. In 1788, Virginia had made it punishable by death, and at
that time it also was an offense in all other states. The Court there-
fore found polygamy licentious, and the statute valid:
"This being so, the only question which remains is whether
those who make polygamy a part of their religion are excepted
from the operation of the statute. If they are, then those who do
not make polygamy a part of their religious belief may be found
guilty and punished, while those who do must be acquitted and
go free. This would be introducing a new element into criminal
law. Laws are made for the government of actions, and while
they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions,
they may with practices. Suppose one believed that human
sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it
be seriously contended that the civil government under which he
lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife
religiously believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the
funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond the power
of the civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into
practice?
"So here, as a law of the organization of society under the ex-
clusive dominion of the United States, it is provided that plural
marriage shall not be allowed. Can a man excuse his practices
to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this
would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief
superior to the law of the land, and in effect permit every citizen
to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in
name under such circumstances."11
11. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1879).
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III. PARENT LuABiLiTY
One hardly would question (although in Part VI I shall explore
the possibility) that the failh-healing adult, sui juris, is free to
submit himself at his own risk to any mode of ministration he
chooses. But in its concern fo:r children's welfare, the state has come
to assert its right to interfere to a considerable extent with the rights
of parenthood and of religion. In England, at common law, it was
a misdemeanor for a parent to neglect to furnish his child necessary
meat, drink, lodging, clothing or 'physic.' And if the parent's neg-
lect caused his child's death, the parent was liable for involuntary
manslaughter-under the common law formula, now incorporated
into most modern statutes, that misdemeanor plus homicide equals
manslaughter. But where a paxent, acting in all good faith and doing
the best he could according to his lights, resorted to faith and prayer
instead of a medical practitioner to heal his sick child, his so omit-
ting to provide 'physic' couli hardly be held to contain a criminal
intent, and neither was his omission considered negligence so gross
and wanton as to be criminal. Thus, "under the common law no
conviction of manslaughter predicated upon an omission to provide
medical attendance upon conscientious motives has been reported,
and none can probably be had or sustained."'12
This was the status of the law in England in January of 1868,
when, at the Wagstaffe trial, an attempt was made to convict a
parent after his child, denied medical aid, died. Judge Willes in-
structed the jury, in effect: "If you find that the parent's refusal to
call medical assistance was due to religious conviction that God will
heal the sick, and not from -the intention to avoid the duties due
from a parent to a child, you may find the prisoner not guilty." The
jury's verdict: not guilty.13
The result in this case finally impressed upon the legislature that
infants were not adequately protected under circumstances such as
these: In July of that same year, when the Poor Law Amendment
Act was passed, section 37 made it a misdemeanor for a parent wil-
fully to neglect to provide necessary medical aid for his child. This
Act was replaced by another in 1889, and by a third in 1894, the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act. Section 1 of this Act pro-
vided: "If any person ... who has the custody, charge, or care of
any child ... wilfully... neglects . . . such child . . .in a manner
likely to cause such child... injury to its health.. . that person shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor." Here the words, "medical aid," did not
appear. Were they to be implied, and, if so, could a parent's reli-
12. 21 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law 199.
13. Reg. v. Wagstaffe, 10 Cox C. C. 530 (1868).
[Vol. 39:48
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gious belief still justify his refusal to provide such medical aid?
Lord Russell answered these questions in 1899, in the case of
Regina v. Senior, which remains today the leading English decision
on this point.
Senior was a member of the "Peculiar People," a faith-healing
sect. When his 9-month-old infant contracted diarrhea and pneu-
monia, Senior called in the elders to pray and anoint the child with
oil, and-though seven of his twelve children already had died under
similar circumstances-refused to call in medical aid. The child died,
and Senior was indicted for manslaughter under the Act. The trial
judge directed the jury that, 1) they must, first of all, be satisfied
that the death of the child had been caused or accelerated by the
want of medical assistance, 2) that medical aid and medicine were
such essential things for the child, and that reasonable care from
the parents in general would have provided them, 3) that the
prisoner's means would have enabled him to do so without an ex-
penditure such as could not be reasonably expected from him, and
4) if he had done anything which was expressly forbidden by
statute, and by so doing had caused or accelerated the child's death,
he would be guilty of manslaughter, no matter what his motive or
state of mind. On this instruction, the jury convicted Senior. On
appeal, Lord Russell, Ch. J., held the trial judge's instruction to be
substantially correct, saying:
"In the act now in force the expression 'medical aid' does not
occur, and it becomes necessary to consider whether the omis-
sion of those words makes any difference with regard to the
present case. It would be an odd result if we were obliged to
come to the conclusion that, in dealing with such a subject as
the protection of children, the legislature had meant to take
what may be described as a retrograde step; for the course of
legislation, and the provisions of the Act of 1894, show an in-
creased anxiety on the part of the legislature to provide for the
protection of infants....
"Whether the words in the statute, 'wilfully neglects,' are
taken together, or, as the learned judge did in directing the jury,
are taken separately, the meaning is very clear. 'Wilfully' means
that the act is done deliberately and intentionally, not by acci-
dent or inadvertence, but so that the mind of the person who
does the act goes with it. 'Neglect' is the want of reasonable
care; that is, the omission of such steps as a reasonable parent
would take, such as are usually taken in the ordinary experience
of mankind, that is, in such a case as the present, provided the
parent had such means as would enable him to take the neces-
sary steps. I agree with the statement in the summing up that
the standard of neglect varied as time went on, and that many
. 55
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things might be legitimately looked upon as evidence of neglect
in one generation, which would not have been thought so in a
preceding generation, and that regard must be had to the habits
and thoughts of the time....
"At the present day, when medical aid is within the reach of
the humblest and poorest members of the community, it cannot
reasonably be suggested that the omission to provide medical aid
for a dying child does not amount to neglect."1 4
Similar child protection statutes have been enacted in Canada
and in all U.S. jurisdictions, and religious belief is uniformly denied
as a defense. That Christian Science treatment is not a legal sub-
stitute for medical attendance was established in 1903 in the Cana-
dian case of Rex v. Lewis." Lewis, a Christian Scientist, was con-
victed of manslaughter under Section 210 (now 241) of the Crimi-
nal Code, after his six-year..old son, treated only by a "demon-
strator," died of diphtheria. The court construed "necessaries of life"
in this section to include medical aid, assistance, care, and treatment,
in cases where ordinarily prudent persons would obtain them; and
held that Christian Science treatment was not a lawful substitute for
medical care, and that a belief in Christian Science was not a lawful
excuse for omitting to provide medical aid. Said Moss, Ch. J. 0.:
"I entirely agree ... that, while the merits or demerits of the
Christian Science or faith are things with which we have nothing
to do as long as it does not transgress or lead to a transgression
of the law, the law of the land is paramount, and it is not for
people to set themselves up in opposition to it; that the law of
the land must be obeyed. and it must be obeyed even though
there be something in the shape of belief in the conscience of the
person which would lead him to obey what in his state of mind
he may consider a higher power or higher authority. And
especially must there be obedience where, as in this instance, the
subject of the judgment to be exercised is a child of tender
years, unable to exercise any judgment of his own. In one form
or another it has been frequently said by able judges, and it
cannot be too widely known or too often repeated, that where
an offense consists of a positive act, which is knowingly done,
the offender cannot escape punishment because he holds a belief
which impels him to think that the law which he has broken
ought not to exist, or ought never to have been made."
In January of 1901, in Valhalla, New York, the 16-month-old
adopted daughter of J. Luther Pierson contracted whooping cough.
This condition continued until February 20, when pneumonia de-
veloped. Though dangerous symptoms were evident for 48 hours
prior to the child's death-oE "catarrhal pneumonia"--Pierson re-
14. Reg. v. Senior, 1 Q. B. Div. 283, 19 Cox C. C. 219 (1899).
15. 6 Ont L. Rep. 132, 1 B. R. C. 732 (1903).
[Vol. 39:48
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fused to call in a physician. He was indicted for misdemeanor for
violating Section 288 of the New York Penal Code, which provided
that a person who wilfully omitted, without lawful excuse, to fur-
nish medical attendance to a minor was guilty of a misdemeanor.
Pierson testified that he belonged to the faith-healing Christian
Catholic Church of Chicago, and that he believed in divine healing
which could be accomplished by prayer; that he did not believe in
physicians, and that his religious faith led him to believe that the
child would get well by means of prayer. The highest court, in sus-
taining Pierson's conviction, ruled out his excuse or justification
for violating the statute. It defined "proper medical attendance" as
that of a licensed physician, and held the statute not to violate
Pierson's constitutional right to freedom of religious profession
and worship. 6
Rubenstein17 lists the above three cases, Senior (1899), Lewis
(1903), and Pierson (1903), as the leading English, Canadian and
United States decisions, respectively, on the question of parent lia-
bility in faith deaths. Later cases (there are many) only define more
sharply the criteria for liability set forth in Regina v. Senior. Since
the turn of the century, then, it has been well established that a
parent commits a misdemeanor when, due to religious belief, he de-
nies his sick child the medical aid required by statute, and that, if
the child consequently dies, the parent is liable for manslaughter. But
what does society gain by so punishing the parent after his child
is dead? Even the stern God of Israel, testing Abraham's faith,
stopped him from sacrificing his son Isaac.' Must we, in our day,
helplessly look on while a fanatical parent completes the sacrifice
of his innocent child upon the altar of his religion? In recent years
the states of Texas, Illinois, Missouri and New York have come
to think otherwise.
IV. PARENS PATRIAE' 9
Patricia Hudson was born in 1930 with a left arm nearly as big
as the rest of her body. This monstrous arm, ten times normal size,
and useless, continued to grow with her at the same rate. When she
was about nine, she was taken to an orthopedic hospital in Seattle,
Washington, where amputation was advised. But her father, an in-
16. People v. Pierson, 176 N. Y. 201, 68 N. E. 243 (1903).
17. Rubenstein, Criminal Aspects of Faith Healing, New England
Journal of Medicine, Feb. 6, 1941.
18. Genesis 22:12.
19. The writer is grateful to the editors of The New England journal
of Medicine, where it first appeared, for permission to re-use the present
account of Parens Patriae.
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valid, "bowed to the will of his wife," and she, because of the risk,
chose to do nothing. Patricia was kept out of school, where the other
children had jeered at her. She often cried, saying that the arm
was "an awful load" and that she wished it were off. At 11, she was
frail and weak, her chest and spine were becoming deformed from
carrying the weight, and in nourishing the arm her heart was
seriously overworked, leavir.g her highly vulnerable to such infec-
tions as pneumonia. The mo)ther never had obtained any medical
or surgical treatment for her, though for four years she employed
a "Divine Healer" who undertook to cure the deformity by prayer
--with obvious unsuccess. In January of 1942, on an adult sister's
complaint, the mother consented to another examination in Seattle.
There, two surgeons said that amputation, though involving a fair
degree of risk of life, was imperative. When the parents refused
either to provide or allow it, the juvenile court's chief probation
officer petitioned for a hearing. On the above facts, the court found
Patricia destitute of proper medical or surgical care and therefore
under the dependency statute, and ordered amputation. But the
Supreme Court of Washington reversed judgment, on the theory
that the State had no power to order medical treatment for an in-
fant against the wishes of its parents.20
In Texas, in August, 1946, Leroy Mitchell grew ill: his right
knee swelled, his face turned pale, and he had to get about on
crutches. Some days he was too weak to get out of bed. But his
widowed mother, who believed in "Divine Healing," refused to
consult a doctor. His condition had not improved, when, in Febru-
ary, 1947, the Chief Probation Officer filed suit as "next friend";
Mrs. Mitchell then called in a doctor who advised that Leroy prob-
ably was suffering from arthritis or complications following rheu-
matic fever, and advised her to secure the services of an ortho-
pedist. She refused, and instead took the boy first to a chiropractor
and then to an osteopath, both of whom failed to recommend a cure.
On these facts, Leroy, then 12, was found to be a neglected child
and was ordered placed in the custody of the Chief Juvenile Officer
so that he might receive proper medical care. On appeal, affirming
judgment, the mother's religious belief was held no defense.21
Cheryl Linn Labrenz was born in Bethany Hospital, Chicago,
on April 11, 1951, with an RH blood condition which threatened
her life. But her mother, 20-year-old Rhoda Labrenz, a Jehovah's
Witness, refused to consent to a blood transfusion: "We feel that
20. In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P. 2d 765 (1942).
21. Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S. W. 2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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we would be breaking God's commandment, also destroying the
baby's life for the future, not only this life, in case the baby should
die and breaks the commandment, not only destroys [sic] our
chances but also the baby's chances for future life. We feel it is
more important than this life." Dr. Herman N. Bundesen, Health
Commissioner, called in the child's father, Darrell, 25, and warned
him of the seriousness of the child's plight and of the need for im-
mediate action. "The sanctity of the blood is a thing we cannot
tamper with," Darrell Labrenz replied. "Everybody knows that
blood is the life force and we do not have control of life. Only
Jehovah has that. Transfusion, which is a form of drinking or eat-
ing blood, is forbidden to us who are Jehovah's Witnesses." 22
On Tuesday, April 17, a petition was filed' in Family Court
alleging the child to be dependent because she was without proper
parental care and guardianship. Hearing was set for the following -
morning. At the opening of court, motions for a continuance and
to dismiss as contrary to the Constitution were taken under advise-
ment. A health department pediatrician gave his expert conclusion:
"Without a transfusion, I will say absolutely, this child cannot
live; or, if it should, could not live without permanent brain in-
jury." Another expert testified that the child's blood count had
dropped from the normal 5,000,000 at birth to 1,950,000. At the
conclusion of the hearing, which took less than an hour, the motions
under advisement were overruled. The Chief Probation Officer
was appointed guardian, with the right to consent to necessary
blood transfusions. An emergency ambulance was waiting at the
courthouse. The transfusion apparatus already had been set up at
Michael Reese Hospital. There, not a minute was wasted in giving
baby Cheryl 60 ccs. of blood. Within three days, she was out of
danger. On May 4, Cheryl was released from the hospital into the
custody of her parents, with the provision that she was to be exam-
ined by a doctor every two weeks. On June 29, 1951, a final order
released her from guardianship. Today, Cheryl Linn is healthy
and leading a normal life with her parents.23
The case was brought to the Supreme Court of Illinois on a
writ challenging the propriety of the lower court's action on con-
stitutional grounds. Justice Schaefer, in affirming judgment, first
ruled against the State's contention that the case was now moot
and should be dismissed because the blood transfusion had been
22. "Flesh, with the life thereof, which is the blood thereof, shall ye not
eat." Genesis 9:4.
23. According to advice received by the writer from an official source
in April, 1954. .. 1
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administered, the guardian discharged, and the proceedings dis-
missed:
"We find that the present case falls within that highly sensi-
tive area in which goverm-ental action comes into contact with
the religious beliefs of individual citizens. Both the construction
of the statute under which the trial court acted and its validity
are challenged. In situations like this one, public authorities
must act promptly if their action is to be effective, and although
the precise limits of authorized conduct cannot be fixed in ad-
vance, no greater uncertainty should exist than the nature of
the problems makes inevitable. In addition, the very urgency
which presses for prompt action by public officials makes it
probable that any similar case arising in the future will likewise
become moot by ordinary standards before it can be determined
by this court."
Did the court below lack jurisdiction because the child was not
a "neglected" or "dependent" child within the meaning of the
statute ?
"So far as here pertinent, the statute defines a dependent or
neglected child as ofie which 'has not proper parental care.'
The record contains no suggestion of any improper conduct on
the part of the parents except in their refusal to consent to a
blood transfusion. And it is argued that this refusal on the part
of the parents does not show neglect, or a lack of parental care.
Neglect, however, is the failure to exercise the care that the
circumstances justly demand. It embraces wilful as well as
unintentional disregard of duty. . . The question here is
whether a child whose parents refuse to permit a blood trans.
fusion, when lack of a transfusion means that the child will
almost certainly die or at best will be mentally impaired for
life, is a neglected child. ]In answering that question it is of no
consequence that the parents have not failed in their duty in
other respects. We entertain no doubt that this child, whose
parents were deliberately depriving it of life or subjecting it
to permanent mental impairment, was a neglected child within
the meaning of the statute. The circuit court did not lack
jurisdiction."
Were the parents merely exercising their right to avoid the
risk of a proposed hazardous operation, a choice not indicative of
a lack of proper parental care? To this proposition the court gave
a short answer:
"The facts here [as against those in the Patricia Hudson
case] disclose no such perilous undertaking, but, on the con-
trary, an urgently needed transfusion-virtually certain of suc-
cess, if given in time-with only such attendant risk as is in-
escapable in all the affairs of life."
Does the Juvenile Court Act as held to be applicable, deprive
the parents of freedom of reli gion and of their rights as parents, in
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violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States and of Section 3 of Art. II of the Constitution of
Illinois?
"Because the governing principles are well settled, this argu-
ment requires no extensive discussion. Concededly, freedom of
religion and the right of parents to the care and training of
their children are to be accorded the highest possible respect in
our basic scheme. But neither rights of religion or rights of
parenthood are beyond limitation [quoting Prince and Rey-
nolds, and referring to Jacobson v. Massachusetts]."
Finally, did the trial court commit prejudicial error in exclud-
ing from evidence the religious magazine, Awake?
"The contention is without merit. Except as it might bear
upon the good faith of the parents' belief in the Scriptural pro-
hibition against blood transfusion, it was inadmissible as hear-
say. And since the sincerity of the parents' religious beliefs was
not questioned, the exclusion of the magazine was not error.
'24
In Kansas City, Missouri, in 1952, baby Janet Lynn Morrison,
the day after she was born, developed symptoms of erythroblastic
anemia, with extreme jaundice and a perilously dropping blood
count. There was no known remedy except blood transfusions, but
to these her father, a Jehovah's Witness, refused to consent. A
complaint accordingly was filed in Juvenile Court and the Labrenz-
type of procedure afterwards followed, the State declaring the in-
fant a neglected child and a ward of the court. There was no one-
day delay as in Illinois; the cause was heard on the same day the
complaint was filed. On appeal, affirming judgment, Commissioner
Sperry said:
"[T]he question presented is: Does the State have the
power, under the above mentioned statute to take the custody of
an infant child from its parents for the purpose of preserving its
life? The question of the right of religious freedom of appellant
is in no sense involved. This proceeding in no wise affects the
right of appellant to believe, religiously, as he professes to be-
lieve, nor does it affect his right to practice his religious belief.
It was not ordered that he eat blood, or that he cease to believe
that the taking of blood, intravenously, is equivalent to the eat-
ing of blood. It is only ordered that he may not prevent another
person, a citizen of our country, from receiving medical atten-
tion necessary to preserve her life.
"The U. S. Supreme Court has held that the regulation, or
suppression of religious practices, is not an invasion of religious
belief and opinion [quoting Reynolds and Prince] . . . We be-
24. People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 II. 618, 104 N. E. 2d 769(1952) ; Time, April 30, 1951, p. 84. In October, 1952, the United States
Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari.
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lieve [referring to the Declaration of Independence] that every
human being is endowed by God with the inalienable right to
live. The fact that the subject is the infant child of a parent
who, arbitrarily, puts his own theological belief higher than his
duty to preserve the life of his child cannot prevail over the
considered judgment of an entire people... The other rights,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness, are of no benefit to a dead
baby... Missouri has the power to interfere in the interests of
one of its infant citizens, helpless in its own behalf, and to take
such steps as may be necessary to preserve its life, over the pro-
test of its father ... society may punish a parent for dereliction
in his duties; but society is not required to stand aside until the
child is dead for want of care, but may take direct steps to pre-
serve the life that the parents neglected to cherish., 25
Thomas Grzyb, 20, and his wife Barbara, 18, lived with his
parents in Cicero,' a suburb of Chicago. All were Jehovah's Wit-
nesses. Thomas and Barbara's first child, Thomas, Jr., was born
on Wednesday, January 6, 1954, at St. Anthony's Hospital, with
a very serious throat condition. 'When their physician told them
the baby needed a blood transfusion, the parents refused to allow
it. The following Tuesday, the boy was operated on for an abdomi-
nal obstruction, and afterwards was in a state of shock. Told their
baby's life now depended on a transfusion, Thomas Grzyb said,
"Our belief won't allow it. It's better to have a dead baby without
the blood than a living baby with the transfusion." Desperate, the
doctor and hospital officials appealed to Dr. Bundesen. He peti-
tioned Chicago's Family Court to declare the Grzybs unfit parents
and to make the infant a court ward. Wednesday morning the
Grzybs were summoned to Family Court and urged, because of the
baby's critical condition, to waive their right to delay the hearing
one day. They refused. "If the baby dies," Barbara Grzyb said,
"that is God's will. I have no fear. The blood won't make any differ-
ence. I am not going to hand him over to the court until I have to.
The judge doesn't care what's in the Bible." Hearing was set for
the 'earliest allowable time: the following morning, Thursday, at
9:30. At St. Anthony's, Wednesday afternoon, the doctor told
reporters, "the baby is getting weaker by the minute. The best we
are doing now is with transfusions of glucose." He stayed there into
the night, hoping the parents would come or telephone. They never
did. And just after midnight, at 12:30 a.m. Thursday morning,
8-day-old Thomas Junior died. At their home, early that morning,
while Barbara repeated, "My baby, my baby !" and sobbed hysteri-
cally, Thomas Grzyb told reporters, "We want more children. But
25. Morrison v. State, 252 S. W. 2d 97 (Mo. App. 1952).
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if such a thing happens again, and if I am called a murderer, that
is God's will. I am sorry the child died. But if it is God's will that
a life be taken, it must be taken." Later, at 9:30, at the now mean-
ingless hearing, they stood dry-eyed and silent while an angry
judge censured them. "You held everybody else from helping the
child," he said, "-while its life was ebbing away."1
2 6
In January of 1954, in Children's Court, Erie County, New
York, an order was sought to have performed-against the wishes
of one Seiferth, the father-corrective surgery on a twelve-year-old
boy who was severely afflicted with a congenital harelip and cleft
palate. This gave him a "hideous" appearance and caused a marked
speech defect, and the child was sensitive to his condition. The
father's objections to court intervention: 1) the child's life or
health was not in immediate danger, 2) the father objected on
"religious" grounds to surgery, 3) the claimed benefits would be
defeated by the child's fears of doctors, originating in the "reli-
gious" beliefs passed on to him by the father, and, 4) when old
enough, the child could decide for himself. Ruled judge Wylegala:
[As to objection 1] "The effects of emotional and psycho-
logical factors during the childhood, adolescence and later for-
mative years of a person are too well known to modem medical
and social sciences to require discussion here. The law also is
well established that the court has power to interfere not only
in matters involving life, health and physical welfare, but also
psychological well-being of children . . ." [As to objection 2]
"The father's objections are based on a personal philosophy-
not a religion-shared with him by a group of ten or fifteen
friends . . . These people . . . believe there are "forces in the
universe" which when available to a properly conditioned sub-
ject can cure him of disease, including the child's cleft palate
and harelip. No evidence was offered that a cleft palate or hare-
lip was ever cured by these forces....
"Objections 3 and 4 will be answered together . . . The
child's handicap is of such nature as to unnecessarily seriously
affect his future welfare. It can be improved to materially bene-
fit him, with reasonable safety and certainty. It should still be
ordered done in spite of the father's objections. But we are
now dealing with a child over 12 years of age, of normal in-
telligence, who has been "conditioned" against the physicians
tampering in any way with the human body ... To arbitrarily
force this child to submit to surgery, which he has been "con-
ditioned" to fear, might do more harm than good. Fortunately
the beliefs held by the father and passed on to the child are not
"religious" and have nothing to do with moral right or wrong.
It should, therefore, not strain the child's conscience, to set him
26. Chicago, Ill., all papers, Jan. 14, 15, 1954.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
right about medical and scientific facts and progress. It is the
studied conviction of this court . .. that the child should be
given the opportunity of making his own decision....
"It is, therefore, the judgment of this court that the father
be restrained from in any way interfering with discussions be-
tween the child and such reasonable number of persons as this
court may designate directed at acquainting the child with the
benefits accruing to him from promptly submitting to the recom-
mended operations. And it is the further judgment that just as
soon as practicable after the child consents to submit to the
operations and therapy, the same be done at the expense of the
father, or in the event that all of such expense cannot be paid
by the father, that prompt application be made to this court for
financial assistance under the law governing such cases. '27
V. THE RIGHT TO PRACTICE
Susie Jessel at 16 saw Jesus standing on a cloud. He told her:
"Go and heal the sick." For 23 years, in Ashland, Oregon, she has
prayed and passed her hands over the sick and crippled. She begins
her 14-hour healing sessions with these words: "I dedicate my
hands to the Lord... The Lord give me the gift, and He did not
give it in vain. If He chooses at times to make it so that they don't
heal, we must remember that we cannot be a winner all the time."
The patient, sitting on a stool, slips into one of Susie's prominent
apron pockets a $1 bill, a "voluntary contribution." Her average
night's take: $500. Oregon's medical practice act, like that of most,
if not all, other states, has a clause which excepts from the licens-
ing requirements those persons who endeavor to treat human ail-
ments by prayer or spiritual means exclusively. Faith-healer Jessel,
with no medical training, is therefore within her legal rights.
Susie's thousands of hopeful patients come from as far away as
Texas and Canada to spend their money in Ashland's booming
motels, stores and restaurants. "She's the biggest business in town
for everybody," said an enthusiastic local undertaker, who last
year buried 18 of Susie's pat.ents.2 1
In December, 1953, "Rev." Martis C. Scalf, 45, evangelist and
member of the Elijah Ministry, was under investigation by the
State Health Department of Iowa, to determine whether he was
violating the medical practice act. Scalf denied being a faith healer:
"I have no power at all, per.sonally. I do no diagnosing. Give the
Holy Spirit the credit." Scadf usually met with groups in farm
houses. When he prayed, the Holy Spirit told him what was wrong
27. In re Seiferth, 127'N. Y. S. 2d 63 (Childrens Ct. 1954). See Recent
Case comment, infra, p. 318.
28. Time, Sept. 7, 1953.
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with a person, and he then relayed the information-usually that
the person had something serious, like heart disease or tuberculosis.
He had told 600 people they had polio, and a much larger number
they had cancer. He never asked for money; "free will" offerings
supplied his needs. One farmer with a persistent cough, told by
Scalf that he had cancer of the lungs, rushed to a hospital for
X-rays, where doctors afterwards assured him that his lungs were
perfect. Scalf maintained that, 1) at the time of his diagnosis, the
farmer did indeed have cancer, but that, 2) in the interval between
diagnosis and hospital, Scalf's prayers healed him.
29
The many present-day cases of prosecutions of professed reli-
gious ministers under medical practice acts all agree in holding that
where religion and medicine are practiced together, the constitu-
tional right to the practice of religion does not justify the con-
current illegal practice of medicine. Among those whose ministra-
tions overstepped the statutory bounds of medical practice, and
who were convicted of practicing medicine without a license: one
Smith (Colo., 1911), self-titled "Healer", who claimed to be a
member of "The Divine Scientific Healing Mission," a corporate
body, and maintained an office where he practiced healing "by the
laying on of hands" ;30 one Vogelgesang (N.Y., 1917), who claimed
to be an ordained spiritualist healer and had an office where he
dispensed ointments, patent medicines and "silent prayer" (said
Judge Cardozo, "The meaning of the act is made plain . . . Im-
munity is granted to those who practice their religious tenets, but
always in such a form as to confine the exemption to spiritual
ministrations") ;31 one Handzik (Ill., 1951), self titled "doctor,"
whose diagnosis was followed by treatment consisting of breathing
exercises, drinking two glasses of water (one "holy," one "atomic"),
the laying on of hands, and prayer, for all of which she accepted
a "donation" ;32 and William and Dora Estep (I1., 1952), who
organized the "Ministry of the Central Baptist Church of Chicago,
Inc.," and embarked upon a grandiose program for the training of
"psycho-physicians" who set about to cure their patients through
the use of various machines invented by Estep, and through prayer.
Here, the indictment was not for misdemeanor, but for conspiracy
to violate the Medical Practice Act. William Estep's sentence: 3
29. Des Moines Register, Dec. 27, 1953.
30. Smith v. People, 51 Colo. 270, 117 Pac. 612 (1911).
31. People v. Vogelgesang, 221 N. Y. 290, 116 N. E. 977 (1917).
32. People v. Handzik, 410 I1. 295, 102 N. E. 2d 340, cert. deded, 343
U. S. 927 (1951).
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years in the penitentiary and a $2,000 fine; Dora received a term of
1 to 2 years and a $2,000 fine.33
In 1911, one Willis Cole, a Christian Science practitioner, was
indicted for practicing medicine as defined by section 160 of New
York State's Public Health Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 45), without
being duly licensed therefor. Section 160 states that a person
practices medicine when he undertakes to diagnose or treat any
human disease by any method. The jury failed to agree and was
discharged. At the second triad, in 1912, Cole was found guilty. In
1916, on appeal to the highest court, Judge Chase held that, on
the evidence, Cole had not undertaken to "diagnose" disease as
defined in Section 160. Cole had, however, by his own admission
undertaken to "treat" by "any means or method," as defined in
section 160, for his prayers were a treatment. Indeed, he had testi-
fied that prayer was a synonym for treatment. Section 160, however,
contained the words "except as hereinafter stated," which conceded-
ly referred to section 173: "This article shall not be construed to
affect ... the practice of the religious tenets of any church." The
case had reached the highest court on Cole's exception to the trial
judge's charge to the jury: that if the evidence showed that Cole
had practiced medicine as alleged in the indictment, it was no
defense that his acts were intended to be the practice of the reli-
gious tenets of the Christian Science Church. Judge Chase held
that the Legislature, in enacting section 173, had intended to ex-
clude from the prohibition the practice of the religious tenets of any
church, and that the question of fact for the jury should have been:
"Was the defendant in good faith practicing the tenets of a church
within the meaning of the statutory exception ?" He reversed judg-
ment and ordered a new trial. Judge Cardozo concurred. Said Chief
Justice Bartlett: "I concur ... But I would go farther. I deny the
power of the Legislature to make it a crime to treat disease by
prayer.P3 4
Thus arises the anomaly of today's child protection and medical
practice acts. The decisions hold that the faith healer's ministrations
do not constitute "proper medical care" for a sick child, and the
parent who calls in such people instead of a qualified physician is
punished, or, if it is not too late, the court undertakes to place the
child in wiser hands. But at the same time, the law does not enjoin
these faith healers from holding themselves out to parents as proper
33. People v. Estep, 346 Ill. App. 132, 104 N. E. 2d 562, appeal trans-
ferred, 409 I1. 125, 97 N. E. 2d 823 (1952).
34. People v. Cole, 219 N. Y. 98, 113 N. E. 790 (1916).
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healers. And afterwards, only the parent of the dead child is hauled
off to court, while the healer who urged upon that gullible parent
a trust in his methods, and a distrust in those of the medical pro-
fession, goes free. The hard fact is that today, from the lone oper-
ator like Susie Jessel to a corporate entity such as the Christian
Science Church-all such, so long as they confine themselves strict-
ly to prayer and spiritual means, are free to practice their profitable
trade, on children as well as adults, and whether they live or die.
VI. THE RIGHT TO SUBMIT
In 1951, Christian Scientist Cora Louise Sutherland, a teacher
in the Los Angeles public schools, developed a hacking cough and
began steadily to lose weight. To avoid the periodic chest X-rays
required of public-school teachers, she submitted an affidavit stat-
ing that she was free of communicable disease. In the fall of 1953
she became too sick to teach. The Christian Science practitioner
who treated her (for a fee of $62 per month) certified her condi-
tion as due to a "lung congestion aggravated by activity." In
March, 1954, her brother finally insisted that she go to a hospital:
her second day there, Cora Sutherland, 55, died of tuberculosis.
The coroner's report: she probably had had the disease in an active,
contagious form for at least two years-for two years she had
exposed all her public school pupils (over 70, each term) to tuber-
culosis. The city health department now is trying to locate all
exposed recent graduates, for chest X-rays.35
Granting (reluctantly) that the sincere faith healer is free to
practice, is the ill adult at the same time entirely free to submit to
his ministrations? Or more practically, under the "corollary": is
the ill adult free to deny himself necessary medical aid?
Two circumstances occur. When the illness of the doctor-deny-
ing-and perhaps disease-denying-sick adult proves not only to
be real but contagious as well, the state, with its overriding interest
in the public health and safety, brushes aside the sick man's claims
to constitution-guaranteed personal liberty and religious freedom,
and at once steps in to apply quarantine regulations. Indeed, it has
been some fifty years since the Supreme Court, in Massachu-
setts' Jacobson case,36 upheld the state's right to go even farther,
and, in the face of a threatened epidemic, to force vaccination upon
its well citizens, regardless of their personal feelings. Had tuber-
culous Cora Sutherland's condition been discovered earlier, there
35. Time, May 24, 1954, p. 55.
36. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (1905).
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is no doubt that the state would summarily have forced her isola-
tion to the extent that she no longer endangered others' health.
But could the state then have gone farther, and forced her to
undertake proper treatment? This is the second circumstance. An
adult is seriously ill but not endangering others. Can he elect to
deny himself the necessary medical aid without which it is clear to
a reasonable man that he will shortly die? The question appears to
reduce to simpler form: is it unlawful to attempt suicide?
At common law, the completed act of suicide was a felony, and
the attempt was a misdemeanor. In England, at one time, the dead
offender was "punished" by the shame of unmarked burial in the
highway and by his heirs forfeiting to the king their right to the
deceased's lands and goods. 'But though this attempted punishment
was abandoned, suicide thereafter was still held, though not pun-
ishable, to be very much a crime-to the practical end that at-
tempted suicide should therefore remain a misdemeanor. Thus, one
who persuaded another to commit suicide was still guilty of murder
as a principal or accessory. Today, in at least eleven states, the
common law of crimes, insofar as it defines and punishes offenses,
has been completely abolished and replaced by statutes. In these
states, no offense is punishable unless made so by statute. In Texas,
the statute makes neither suicide nor furnishing the means a crime.
In other states, the common law has in some particulars been re-
pealed or superseded by statute but in all other respects remains
in effect. Under such a statute in Missouri, one who assists another
to commit suicide is guilty of manslaughter.
3 7
But I hear the reader's voice objecting: "This is all very inter-
esting, but I still have not quite managed to swallow your first
premise-that refusal of necessary medical aid is identical with
attempted suicide. In the former, where is the criminal intent?"
Granting the objection, I would reply that, even so, the above
paragraph has yielded an answer in part. The answer: in those
states where attempted suicide has been made lawful by statute
(or the lack of one), the refusal of necessary medical aid, whether
equal to or less than attempted suicide, must be conceded to be
lawful.
This leaves the question of those states where the common law
in this respect remains unchanged-where attempted suicide re-
mains a misdemeanor. Here, I have no case to cite, and instead
must submit a conjecture which leans on the significance of the
Wagstaffe trial. In pre-Wagstaffe times, the faith-healing parent's
37. Clark and Marshall, Crimes, §§ 14, 35, 114, 245, 247 (1940).
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religious belief negated any "negligence so gross and wanton as to
be criminal," when he denied his child proper medical care, while
in post-Wagstaffe times, the child protection statutes created a
positive duty for the parent to furnish his child with proper medi-
cal care, against which a religious belief to the contrary was held
to be no defense. Again, then, in pre-Wagstaffe times could the ill
adult who relied on faith and prayer for his own cure be found to
entertain the criminal intent required to make up the crime of
attempted suicide? I think not, for his only intent was to get well.
And since no present-day "adult protection statute" has appeared
to complete the parallel, this status of the ill adult must remain
unchanged.
Newspaper accounts appear to confirm this result. In Texas, in
1952, one Fred Newhouse, 24, a Jehovah's Witness, was badly
injured in an auto accident, and in such a way that doctors dared
not proceed with a necessary operation without a transfusion. But
when Newhouse refused, on religious grounds, to allow the trans-
fusion, the law did not intervene.38 In Missouri, in 1952, an Ozarks
minister, Rev. J. J. Ivie, tried in vain to obtain a "revelation of
God's will," then vowed to pray and fast until God gave him a
sign. After 51 days of fasting and praying, and still without the
prayed-for sign, he died. During his fast, which received nation-
wide publicity in the newspapers, no attempt at any time was made
to stop him, even though, towards the end, Ivie's religion-motivated
determination clearly was leading to his death.39 Society and the
courts seem to say: "We are determined that a child shall grow up
safely and in good health to maturity, and we will intervene when
his life or health is threatened by his parent's religious or other
eccentricities. But having taken the trouble so to see him into man-
hood, why, if he thereafter chooses foolishly to endanger his own
life-and does not at the same time endanger others-then we
wash our hands of him."
VII. PASTOR LIABILITY
If the adult, mdi juris, is free to choose a suicidal faith cure, one
hardly would expect to find any criminal liability attaching to the
friend who counsels him to such an undertaking. But what of the
faith-healing friend, pastor or practitioner who persuades a parent
to rely upon faith and prayer to cure his sick child? Here the
parent, regardless of his belief, is under a statutory duty to furnish
38. Time, May 12, 1952, p. 55.
39. Boston Globe, June 9, 1952, p. 1.
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such medical care, and is criminally liable if he does not. And is it
not basic in criminal law that one who counsels another to a crime
is also guilty as principal or accessory?
In Toronto, on October 28, 1895, six-year-old Percy Robert
Beck complained of a mild sore throat. His parents, Christian
Scientists, called in a practitioner, Mrs. Mary Ellen Beer, to treat
him. Her treatment consisted "in simply sitting by the bedside,
rarely saying anything, never prescribing, nor in any way touching
the child, or making any examination or otherwise diagnosing the
patient." But that same day, Percy died. A post mortem revealed
"diphtheria of a non-malignant character, a disease rarely fatal."
According to later medical testimony, the boy probably would have
recovered if the disease had been treated properly; also, his death
definitely had been accelerated by his not receiving proper medical
attendance. Mrs. Beer was indicted for manslaughter and prose-
cuted on two theories: 1) tor improper treatment of disease, and
2) as an accessory, in that she counselled or procured, or aided and
abetted the father in his disregard of his legal duty to provide the
child with medical attention. As to the first theory, a statute pro-
vided that everyone who undertakes, except in case of necessity, to
administer surgical or medical treatments is under a legal duty to
have and to use reasonable knowledge, skill, and care in doing any
such act. Judge Falconbridge held, however, that Mrs. Beer had
not been retained, nor was she expected to, nor did she, come in as
a medical attendant, and that the failure to examine the child in the
manner in which a doctor would do, and which was the negligence
relied on by the prosecution, was exactly what was expected of her
as a Christian Science practitioner. As to the second theory, Judge
Falconbridge first refused to accept the defense contention that
there could be no accessory to manslaughter. But the court failed
to find any evidence of "counselling or procuring," and further
opined that it was impossible to "aid and abet" in another's doing
nothing, i.e., in failing to provide medical attention. She therefore
was acquitted.4 0
In Canada, in 1902, two of the children of one John Rogers, a
member of the faith-healing "Catholic Christians in Zion," con-
tracted diphtheria. Rogers, with the counsel of one Brooks-who
apparently was only Rogers' friend, not his pastor-refused to call
in medical attendance. Both children died. Rogers was indicted for
manslaughter and convicted. Brooks was indicted at the same time
as an accessory to the father's neglect. The indictment (in Rc.x v.
40. Reg. v. Beer, 32 Can. 1,. J. 416 (1895).
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Brooks)41 charged Brooks with being present, "unlawfully aiding,
abetting, assisting, counselling and procuring John Rogers not to
regard his duty to provide his child with medical attention, by
reason of which neglect the child died." In convicting Brooks, the
court noted that, by virtue of section 61 (now 69) 42 of the Code, he
could just as well have been prosecuted as a principal.
In Winnipeg, on Wednesday, November 5, 1924, 12-year-old
Doreen Watson, daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Robert Watson, Chris-
tian Scientists, complained of a headache. Mrs. Watson asked
William Elder, a Christian Science practitioner, to treat her. The
next morning, Doreen's neck started to swell; that afternoon, her
nose was stuffed. Friday her breathing became more difficult. Sun-
day evening, Elder came to see her; after leaving, he told her
mother he would go on with the treatment. Monday morning, No-
vember 10, Elder telephoned Mrs. Watson that Mr. Robb, who
had been her special practitioner, had returned to Winnipeg. She
then telephoned Robb and suggested that a medical doctor be called
in. As Mrs. Watson later testified: "We did not know what the
trouble was, and we wanted to know. I never heard of a Christian
Scientist diagnosing any case." On Tuesday evening, November
11, a Dr. Fraser-Elder having that day asked him to see a case he
was treating in order to make a diagnosis--came to the Watsons'
house with Elder. At that time, Doreen's nostrils were completely
obstructed so that she could not breathe through them, her lips and
mouth were dry and cracked, her nostrils were red and irritated
and there was an irritating discharge from them, her breath was
exceedingly offensive, the glands of her neck on each side under the
jaw were quite swollen and prominent, both tonsils were covered
with a dense, heavy, gray membrane which extended across the
uvula and up in the nasal cavities, and where her throat was not
covered with membrane it was red and inflamed. Before leaving,
Dr. Fraser took a swab of Doreen's throat.
Downstairs, Dr. Fraser told Mr. and Mrs. Watson that the
child had nasal and pharyngeal diphtheria, a very serious attack,
and that she was dangerously ill. He advised that antitoxin be given
at once and that she should be sent to the hospital immediately.
They refused. Mrs. Watson said, "I have no fear." She told of
having for years suffered attacks of quinsy, and of being cured by
41. Rex v. Brooks, 22 Can. L. T. 105, 9 B. C. R. 13 (1902).
42. "Every one is a party to and guilty of an offense who, (a) actually
commits it; or (b) does or omits an act for the purpose of aiding any per-
son to commit the offense; or (c) abets any person in commission of the
offense; or (d) counsels or procures any person to commit the offense...."
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Christian Science treatment for diphtheria. Elder told Mrs. Watson
that he would immediately take steps to break up the disease. The
following morning, Dr. Fraser telephoned Elder that the smear
was reported suspicious, and to go carefully or he would have a
tragedy on his hands. Elder replied that he was going carefully.
On the morning of November 13, Dr. Fraser told Elder that the
report on the swab was positive, confirming the diagnosis of diph-
theria. Elder replied that he no longer was in charge of the case,
but had turned it over to Robb. That afternoon, Robb called Dr.
Fraser and both went to the WNatsons' home. The doctor examined
the child and found her condition worse. Doreen died on Novem-
ber 22.43
William Elder was indicted for manslaughter, charged with
having actively aided, abetted, counselled, or procured Robert
Watson to omit to supply his daughter with the necessaries of life.
The jury found him guilty. On appeal, however, because the only
direct evidence of counselling and abetting was that of a police
constable who had taken down Elder's statement in a notebook and
then lost it, the evidence was ruled inadmissible and judgment
reversed.?4
It is clear that, in Canada, criminal liability attaches to the
pastor or other adult who actively counsels a parent against fur-
nishing his child with necessary medical care. In the Canadian
Bar Review for August-September, 1953, a Winnipeg attorney,
Mr. Roy St. George Stubbs, indicates that Rex v. Brooks is fol-
lowed there today:
"No such anomaly [as in the United States] exists in
Canadian law. If a pastor persuades one of his followers to rely
on prayer, to deny medical aid to his child, and the child dies,
and it can be established in evidence that the child would have
survived under proper medical care, the pastor may be con-
victed of manslaughter-not as an accessory before the fact,
which Mr. Cawley seems :o think he is, but as a principal."
In the United States, I find no such case reaching the higher
courts. I find, in fact, only one such attempt at a conviction, and
this ended in the trial court. 'n Los Angeles, in 1938, Mrs. Lillian
Volstad, a widow, attended a "mission" run by Apostolic preacher,
Rev. Wilbur W. Alvis. When the Volstad family physician found
43. Earlier the same morning Mrs. Watson was taken ill. A Dr. Moody
examined her, pronounced her illness to be diphtheria, and ordered antitoxin
administered to her. After this was done, she was taken to the St. George
Hospital, where she recovered after treatment See Rex v. Elder, 35 Man.
Rep. 161 (1925).
44. Ibid.
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that Mrs. Volstad's 9-year-old son Francis had acute appendicitis,
the doctor urged an immediate operation. Mrs. Volstad and the
minister instead resorted to prayer. Five days later, officers ar-
rived with a Juvenile Court order to remove the boy to the General
Hospital for an operation, but before the operation could be per-
formed, he died of peritonitis. Both Alvis and Mrs. Volstad were
indicted for manslaughter. Mrs. Volstad was convicted. In ac-
quitting Alvis, the judge at the same time excoriated him for his
conduct and called him a "religious racketeer.
'4 5
At first thought, one might suppose that there never could be
an accessory before the fact to manslaughter, since manslaughter
implies lack of premeditation; and this is true for voluntary man-
slaughter. But it is not true for the involuntary manslaughter, aris-
ing from criminal negligence, with which we are here concerned,
for one may incite another to criminal negligence. Clark and Mar-
shall make the point:
".... if two men drive separate vehicles at a furious and
dangerous speed along the highway, each inciting and abetting
the other, and one of them drives over and kills a person, the
one thus causing the death is guilty of manslaughter as principal
in the first degree, and the other is guilty as principal in the
second degree... If one should incite another to so drive, and
should be absent when the latter runs over and kills a person,
he would be guilty of manslaughter as accessory before the
fact."4 16
One might ask, too, "Where a statute establishing a crime im-
poses punishment only on the person who actually commits the
crime, and not in general terms upon those who are guilty accord-
ing to common-law rules, are mere aiders and abettors within the
act?" One Kentucky case held they were not, but this case was
later overruled, and the rule established that, unless it is plain from
the statute that its intent is to affect only the party actually com-
mitting the offense, aiders and abettors are punishable.4 7 It would
be hard to defend the premise that one who leads another to commit
a crime should himself incur no liability.
But if the principles of law are sound, one still must consider
that a state's criminal laws are prosecuted on but a county-wide
scale, by the state's attorney for that county, who previously has
faced the problem of getting himself elected by the voters of that
county, and who later may be a candidate for re-election. His lack
45. See Los Angeles Times, Sept. 3, Nov. 18, 19, 22, 29 (1938).
46. Clark & Marshall, supra note 37, at § 157 (d).
47. Id. at § 157(b).
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of enthusiasm for initiating all-out prosecutions in this religion-
mixed area of the law is understandable. It is significant that both
in People v. Pierszon and in Owens v. State"' the indictment sought
was only for misdemeanor, for violation of the "neglect" statute,
though the records in both cases clearly show to be present all the
elements necessary for a manslaughter conviction.
The situation in the United States today, then, is this: that all
manner of faith healers are allowed to run around loose, free to
persuade parents to rely on prayer alone for their children's ills, and
free of liability for the tragic results. I submit that here is the
glaring anomaly in our law: that the parent who denies a child
medical aid is punished, while the pastor who counsels that denial
goes free. Here, in this area, it is time to re-assess our existing
legal boundary between religious freedom and fanatical religious
irresponsibility.
48. 6 Okla. Cr. 110, 116 Pac. 345 (1911).
